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I.  INTRODUCTION
The turbulence and collapse of the European Exchange Rate Mechanism in 1992-93 and the
onset of the Mexican crisis in December 1994 have rekindled interest in both academic and
policy circles in the potential causes and the symptoms of currency crises. In particular, there
is a question as to whether those symptoms can be detected with sufficient advance so as to
allow governments to adopt pre-emptive measures. While accurately forecasting the timing
of currency crises is likely to remain an elusive goal for academics and policymakers alike,
there is no question about the need to develop and improve upon a warning system that helps
monitor whether a country may be slipping into a situation that is bound to end up in a crisis.
The purpose of this paper is to examine the available evidence on currency crises and to
propose a specific early warning system. To this end, the paper first reviews briefly the
theoretical literature on currency crises. Although there are excellent surveys available which
provide comprehensive discussions of a number of theoretical issues, this paper narrows its
focus to identifying the various indicators suggested by alternative explanations of currency
crises. The discussion encompasses papers within the traditional approach, which stress the
role played by weak economic fundamentals in inducing a currency crisis, as well as more
recent papers, including those that highlight the possibility of self-fulfilling crises.
Second, the paper surveys the empirical literature to take stock of the various approaches that
have been used to assess the usefulness of potential indicators of currency crises, and to
identify those indicators that have been the most effective. The results indicate that an
effective warning system should consider a broad variety of indicators, since currency crises
seem to be usually preceded by multiple economic problems.
Third, the paper compares the relative merits of  alternative approaches in providing early
indications of currency crises, and based on this comparison, proposes a specific
methodology for the design of an early warning system. While this methodology is novel in
the literature on currency crises, it has a long history in the literature concerned with
forecasting turning points in the business cycle.
The warning system proposed in the paper-the  "signals" approach-essentially  involves
monitoring the evolution of a number of economic indicators that tend to systematically
behave differently prior to a crisis. Every time that an indicator exceeds a certain threshold
value, this is interpreted as a warning "signal" that a currency crisis may take place within the
following 24 months. The threshold values are calculated so as to strike a balance between
the risk of having many false signals (if a signal is issued at the slightest possibility of a
crisis) and the risk of missing many crises (if the signal is issued only when the evidence is
overwhelming). Also, since the group of indicators that are issuing signals would be
identified, this helps provide information about the source(s) of the problems that underlie
the probability of a crisis.
The variables that have the best track record in anticipating crises in the context of the
"signals" approach, include: output, exports, deviations of the real exchange rate from trend,
equity prices, and the ratio of broad money to gross international reserves. Furthermore, on
average, these and other indicators provide signals with sufficient advance so as to allow for
pre-emptive policy measures. The evidence does not provide support for some of the other
indicators that were considered, including imports, the differential between foreign and-5 -
domestic  real deposit  interest  rates, the ratio of lending  to deposit  interest  rates, and bank
deposits.
The rest of the paper is organized  as follows.  Section  II briefly  summarizes  the theoretical
literature  on currency  crises,  while Section  III presents  a more detailed  discussion  of the
empirical  literature,  describing  the various  methodologies  and variables  that have been  used
to assess  the probability  of a crisis,  and highlighting  those variables  that have  been identified
as the most useful  indicators.  Section  IV discusses  the relative  merits  of alternative
methodologies,  and, on this basis, proposes  an specific  procedure  to design  of an early
warning  system.  It also uses  this methodology  to evaluate  the predictive  ability of fifteen
macroeconomic  and financial  variables.  Section  V presents  some  concluding  remarks.
II.  THE THEORETICAL  LITERATURE
This section  summarizes  the main explanations  for speculative  attacks  and balance-of-
payments  crises  that have  been  presented  in the theoretical  literature.  The aim  is to provide
some  background  as to why a variety of indicators  have been used in empirical  work on
crises. 2 The theoretical  literature  on balance-of-payments  crises  has flourished  following
Krugman's  seminal  paper of 1979.  Initially,  this literature  stressed  that crises were caused  by
weak  "economic  fundamentals,"  such  as excessively  expansionary  fiscal and monetary
policies,  which  resulted  in a persistent  loss of international  reserves  that ultimately  forced  the
authorities  to abandon  the parity.  More  recently,  however,  some  papers  have argued  that the
authorities  may  decide  to abandon  the parity for reasons  other  than a depletion  of official
international  reserves.  Instead,  they  may be concerned  about  the adverse  consequences  of
policies  needed  to maintain  the parity (such  as higher interest  rates)  on other key economic
variables  (such as the level of employment).
Recent  models  also have shown  that a crisis  may develop  without  a significant  change  in the
fundamnentals.  In these models,  economic  policies  are not predetermined  but respond  to
changes  in the economy,  and economic  agents  take this relationship  into account  in forming
their expectations.  This set of assumptions  opens the possibility  for multiple  equilibria  and
self-fulfilling  crises.  These  recent  theoretical  developments  accord  a smaller  role to
fundamentals  in generating  balance-of-payments  crises,  but they also have highlighted  the
importance  that other  variables  may have  in helping  to predict those  crises.
A. The Traditional  Approach
Krugman's  (1979)  model shows  that, under a fixed  exchange  rate, domestic  credit  expansion
in excess  of money  demand  growth  leads  to a gradual  but persistent  loss of international
reserves  and, ultimately,  to a speculative  attack on the currency.  This attack immediately
depletes  reserves  and forces  the authorities  to abandon  the parity.  The process  ends with an
attack because  economic  agents  understand  that the fixed exchange  rate  regime ultimately
will collapse,  and that in the absence  of an attack  they would  suffer a capital  loss on their
holdings  of domestic  money.  This model  suggests  that  the period preceding  a currency  crisis
2For  detailed  surveys  of the theoretical  literature  see Agenor,  Bhandari,  and Flood
(1992),  Blackburn  and Sola (1993),  and Garber  and Svensson  (1994).  Gupta  (1996)  presents
a short survey  of theoretical  and empirical  results  on currency  and banking  crises.-6-
would  be characterized  by a gradual  but persistent  decline  in international  reserves  and a
rapid growth  of domestic  credit  relative  to the demand  for money.  Also, to the extent  that
excessive  money  creation  may  result from the need  to finance  the public  sector, fiscal
imbalances  and credit  to the public  sector also could serve  as indicators  of a looming  crisis.
A number  of papers  have extended  Krugman's  basic  model  in various directions. 3 Some  of
these extensions  have shown  that speculative  attacks  would  generally  be preceded  by a real
appreciation  of the currency  and a deterioration  of the trade balance.  These  results  have been
derived  from models  in which expansionary  fiscal and credit  policies  lead  to higher  demand
for traded  goods (which  causes  a deterioration  of the trade balance)  and nontraded  goods
(which causes  an increase  in the relative  price of these goods, and thus a real appreciation  of
the currency).  They  also follow  from models  in which  expectations  of a future crisis  lead  to
an increase  in nominal  wages  which, in the presence  of sticky  prices, results in higher  real
wages and lower  competitiveness.  Also, models  that introduce  uncertainty  about credit  policy
or about  the level of reserves  losses  that the authorities  are willing  to sustain  to defend  the
parity,  show  that domestic  interest  rates would  increase  as a crisis  becomes  more likely.
Thus, these  models  suggest  that the evolution  of the real exchange  rate, the trade or current
account  balance,  real  wages,  and domestic  interest  rates,  could  be used as leading  indicators
of crises.
B. Recent Models
While  the traditional  approach  stresses  the role played  by declining  international  reserves  in
triggering  the collapse  of a fixed  exchange  rate, some  recent  models  have suggested  that the
decision  to abandon  the parity may stem from  the authorities' concern  about  the evolution  of
other  key economic  variables-suggesting that yet another  family of variables  could  be
useful  in helping  predict  currency  crises.
For instance,  Ozkan  and Sutherland  (1995)  present  a model  in which  the authorities'
objective  function  depends  positively  on certain  benefits  derived  from keeping  a fixed
nominal  exchange  rate (such as enhanced  credibility  in their efforts  to reduce  inflation)  and
negatively  on the deviations  of output from a certain  target level.  Under  a fixed  exchange
rate, increases  in foreign  interest  rates lead to higher domestic  interest  rates and lower  levels
of output,  making  it more costly  for the authorities  to maintain  the parity.  Once  foreign
interest  rates exceed  some  critical  level,  the cost of keeping  the exchange  rate fixed surpasses
the benefits,  and the authorities  abandon  the parity. Based  on this model,  therefore,  the
evolution  of output and domestic  and foreign  interest  rates  may be useful as indicators  of
currency  crises.
More generally,  this approach  suggests  that a variety of factors  which  may affect  the
authorities' objective  function  could  be used as leading  indicators  of currency  crises.  For
instance,  an increase  in domestic  interest  rates needed  to maintain  a fixed exchange  rate may
3References  to these papers  can be found  in the surveys  mentioned  above.  In addition
to those described  in the main  text, the extensions  include  post-collapse  exchange  systems
other  than a permanent  float (such as fixed, crawling,  and transitory  float),  the possibility  of
foreign  borrowing,  capital  controls,  imperfect  asset substitutability,  and speculative  attacks  in
which  the domestic  currency  is under  buying rather  than selling  pressure.- 7 -
result in higher financing costs for the government. To the extent that the authorities are
concerned about the fiscal consequences of their exchange rate policy, the decision to
abandon the parity may depend on the stock of public debt. Also, higher interest rates may
weaken the banking system, and the authorities may prefer to devalue rather than incur the
cost of a bailout that could result from an explicit or implicit official guarantee on the
banking system liabilities. 4 Therefore, the presence of banking problems (say, as reflected in
the relative price of bank stocks, the proportion of non-performing loans, central bank credit
to banks, or a large decline in deposits) could also indicate a higher likelihood of a crisis.
Leading indicators may also include political variables.
Recent models also have suggested that crises may develop without any noticeable change in
economic fundamentals. These models emphasize that the contingent nature of economic
policies may give rise to multiple equilibria and generate self-fulfilling crises. A crucial
assumption in these models is that economic policies are not predetermined but respond
instead to changes in the economy and that economic agents take this relationship into
account in forming their expectations. At the same time, the expectations and actions of
economic agents affect some variables to which economic policies respond. This circularity
creates the possibility for multiple equilibria and the economy may move from one
equilibrium to another without a change in the fundamentals. Thus, the economy may be
initially in an equilibrium consistent with a fixed exchange rate, but a sudden worsening of
expectations may lead to changes in policies that result in a collapse of the exchange regime,
thereby validating agents' expectations.
In Obstfeld (1994), the expectation of a collapse leads to higher wages and lower
employment, which prompts the government to abandon the parity out of concern for output.
In a second model, expectations of a collapse lead to higher interest rates, prompting the
government to abandon the parity out of concern for the increased cost of servicing the public
debt. As indicated in Obstfeld (1996), the increase in interest rates also could work through
other channels that may affect the government's objective function. For instance, an increase
in interest rates may increase the probability of a banking crisis and the associated fiscal costs
of a bailout.
Tlhe  main implication of models with self-fulfilling crises regarding the possibility of
predicting crises is a negative one. This type of model suggests that it may be difficult to find
a tight relationship between fundamentals and crises, as sometimes crises may take place
without a previous significant change in fundamentals. Finally, some recent papers have
focused on contagion effects as the spark of a balance-of-payments crisis. For instance,
Gerlach and Smets (1994) present a model in which the devaluation by one country leads its
trading partners to devalue in order to avoid a loss of competitiveness. 5 Contagion effects
also may arise if investors pay little heed to countries' economic fundamentals, and thus do
4Velasco (1987) and Calvo (1995) link balance of payments crises to problems in the
banking sector.
5As the authors indicate, the same effect could be derived in a model with multiple
equilibria, in which the devaluation by a trade partner serves to coordinate a worsening of
expectations about the domestic economy and generate a self-fulfilling speculative attack.-8  -
not discriminate properly among countries. 6 If contagion effects are present, a crisis in a
neighboring country may be an indicator of a future domestic crisis.
III. INDICATORS  AND  CRISES: THE EMPIRICAL  LITERATURE
This section begins with a description of the various methodologies and variables that have
been used in the empirical literature to characterize the period preceding currency crises and
to assess the probability of such crises. It then proceeds to narrow the list of potential leading
indicators to those variables which appear to have worked best, and concludes by
highlighting some of the key findings of this literature.
A. Alternative Approaches: A Description
Table 1 provides a summary of 25 selected empirical studies on currency crises. The first
column lists the study, the second describes the sample periods and the periodicity of the
data, and the third provides informnation  on the countries covered and the type of episode
examined. The fourth column lists the economic and political variables that have been used
as indicators, and the last column sketches certain features of the methodology used and the
principal goal of the study in question.
These studies provide information on the numerous and varied experiences with currency
crises. They examine sample periods that run from the early 1950s to the mid 1990s, and
cover both industrial and developing countries, although with more emphasis on the latter.
About half of the studies use monthly data, with the rest using annual or quarterly data, or
data of varied periodicity. Most of the papers examine the experience of various countries
and study several crisis episodes; only a few papers focus on a single country.
The studies also vary with respect to how a "crisis" is defined. Most of the studies focus
exclusively on devaluation episodes. Some of them examine large and infrequent
devaluations, 7 while others include in their sample small and frequent devaluations that may
not fit the mold of a full-blown currency crisis. 8 A few studies adopt a broader definition of
crises. They include, in addition to devaluations, episodes of unsuccessful speculative
attacks; i.e., attacks that were averted without a devaluation, but at the cost of a large increase
in domestic interest rates and/or a sizable loss of international reserves. 9
6Calvo and Reinhart (1996) discuss these and other channels for the transmission of
contagion effects.
7For instance, Edwards (1989), Edwards and Montiel (1989), Edwards and Santaella
(1993), and Frankel and Rose (1996).
8For instance, Collins (1995), Flood and Marion (1995), Kamin (1988), and Klein and
Marion (1994).
9This group includes Eichengreen, Rose, and Wyplosz (1995), Kaminsky and
Reinhart (1996), and Sachs, Tornell and Velasco (1996).-9-
Regarding  the methodology  used, the various  papers  can be grouped  into four broad
categories.  A first group of papers provide  only a qualitative  discussion  of the causes  and
developments  leading  to the currency  crises.  These  papers often stress  the evolution  of one or
more indicators,  but no formal  tests are conducted  to evaluate  the usefulness  of the various
indicators  in predicting  crises." 0
A second group  of papers  examine  the stylized  facts of the period leading  up to and
immediately  following  the currency  crisis. Sometimes  the pre-crisis  behavior  of a variable  is
compared  to its behavior  during  "tranquil"  or non-crises  periods  for the same group of
countries."'  In other  instances,  the control  group is composed  of countries  where no crisis
occurred." 2 Parametric  and nonparametric  tests are used  to assess  whether  there are
systematic  differences  between  the pre-crisis  episodes  and  the control  group.  These tests can
be useful  in narrowing  the list of potential  indicators,  as not all the variables  included  in the
analysis  ended  up showing  "abnormal"  behavior  in advance  of crises.
A third group of papers estimate  the probability  of devaluation  one or several  periods ahead,
usually  on the basis  of an explicit  theoretical  model,  along  the lines  pioneered  by Blanco  and
Garber (1986)  in their discussion  of the Mexican  crisis  of the early 1980s.  These  papers
include individual  country  studies  and multi-country  panel studies." 3 Some  of these papers
also have  attempted  to shed light on the variables  that determine  the size of the devaluation.  4
In a related  spirit,  Sachs,  Tomell, and Velasco  (1996)  seek to identify  those  macroeconomic
variables  that can help  explain which  countries  were vulnerable  to "contagion  effects"
following  the Mexican  crisis of December  1994.  The results  from this group of studies  also
help to narrow  the list of useful  indicators,  as not all the variables  included  turned out to be
statistically  significant  in the logit (or probit)  estimation  exercises  typically  undertaken.
A fourth  type of methodology  is used in Kaminsky  and Reinhart  (1996).  This paper  presents
a nonparametric  approach  to evaluate  the usefulness  of several  variables  in signaling  an
'0For instance,  Dombusch,  Goldfajn,  and Valdes (1995)  stress an overvalued
exchange  rate; Goldstein  (1996)  emphasize  a boom in bank lending;  Krugman  (1996)  focuses
on the high debt levels;  while  Milesi-Ferretti  and Razin (1995)  highlight  the role of servicing
costs (adjusted  for growth  and changes  in the real exchange  rate).
"For example,  Eichengreen,  Rose, and Wyplosz  (1995),  Frankel  and Rose (1996),
and Moreno  (1995).
'2See, for instance,  Edwards  (1989),  Edwards  and Santaella  (1993),  and Kamin
(1988).
" 3Individual  countries  are discussed  in Cumby  and van Wijnbergen  (1989),  Kaminsky
and Leiderman  (1995),  Otker  and Pazarbasioglu  (1994 and 1995),  among  others.  Multi-
country  studies  include  Collins  (1995),  Edin  and Vredin (1993),  Edwards  (1989),
Eichengreen,  Wyplosz  and  Rose (1995),  Frankel  and Rose (1996),  and Klein  and Marion
(1994).
"4For instance,  Bilson (1978),  Edin and Vredin  (1993)  and Flood and Marion (1995).- 10-
impending crisis. It can be interpreted as an extension of the methodology that compares the
behavior of variables in periods preceding crises with that in a control group. This approach
involves monitoring the evolution of a number of economic variables whose behavior usually
departs from "normal" in the period preceding a currency crisis. Deviations of these variables
from their "normal" levels beyond a certain threshold value, are taken as warning "signals" of
a currency crisis within a specified period of time. Based on the track record of the various
indicators, it is possible to assess their individual and combined ability to predict crises. This
approach is explained in detail in Section IV.
B.  The Indicators
The studies reviewed in this paper used a large variety of indicators. Table 2 presents a list of
the 103 indicators used, grouped into six broad categories and some sub-categories," 5
including:  (1) the external sector; (2) the financial sector; (3) the real sector; (4) the public
finances; (5) institutional and structural variables; and (6) political variables. The indicators
of the external sector were, in turn, classified into those related to the capital account, the
external debt profile, the current account, and international (or foreign) variables. The
indicators of the financial sector were split into those that could be associated with financial
liberalization, and other indicators.
It is important to note that many of the indicators listed in Table 2 are transformations of the
same variable. For instance, several variables are expressed alternatively in levels or in rates
of change; sometimes on their own and other times relative to some standard (such as the
same variable in a trading partner). For instance, the real exchange rate is expressed,
alternatively, on a bilateral basis or in real effective terms; sometimes in levels and other
times as deviations from either purchasing power parity, a time trend, or its historical
average. The use of scale factors also varies across studies. For example, alternative scale
factors used for international reserves include GDP, base money, MI, and the level of
imports.
After consolidating the different transformations of the same variable, the main indicators
used in empirical work, classified by category, are as follows:
*  Capital account: international reserves, capital flows, short-term capital flows,
foreign direct investment, and the differential between domestic and foreign interest
rates.
*  Debt profile: public foreign debt, total foreign debt, short-term debt, share of debt
classified by type of creditor and by interest structure, debt service, and foreign aid.
*  Current account: the real exchange rate, the current account balance, the trade
balance, exports, imports, the terms of trade, the price of exports, savings and
investment.
"Although the proper classification for most indicators is unambiguous, that of other
indicators is to some extent arbitrary as they could have been properly classified in more than
one category.*  International  variables:  foreign  real GDP  growth,  interest  rates, and price level.
*  Financial  liberalization:  credit growth,  the change  in the money  multiplier,  real
interest  rates,  and the spread  between  bank lending  and deposit  interest  rates.
*  Other  fmancial  variables:  central  bank credit  to the banking  system,  the gap
between  money  demand  and supply,  money  growth,  bond yields, domestic  inflation,
the "shadow"  exchange  rate,  the parallel  market  exchange  rate premium,  the central
exchange  rate parity,  the position  of the exchange  rate within the official  band, and
M2/international  reserves.
*  Real sector:  real GDP  growth,  the output  gap, employment/unemployment,  wages,
and changes  in stock  prices.
*  Fiscal  variables:  the fiscal deficit,  government  consumption,  and credit  to the public
sector.
*  Institutional/structural  factors:  openness,  trade concentration,  and dummies  for
multiple  exchange  rates,  exchange  controls,  duration  of the fixed exchange  rate
periods,  financial  liberalization,  banking  crises,  past foreign  exchange  market  crises,
and past foreign  exchange  market  events." 6
*  Political  variables:  dummies  for elections,  incumbent  electoral  victory  or loss,
change  of government,  legal executive  transfer,  illegal  executive  transfer,  left-wing
government,  and new finance  minister;  also, degree  of political  instability  (qualitative
variable  based  on judgement).
C.  What Worked Best?
This section  describes  the criteria  used  to identify  those  indicators  that have proven  to be
most useful  in predicting  crises.  The idea is to select  the indicators  whose  contribution  to the
prediction  of crises  was found to be statistically  significant,  based  on the results  presented  in
the original  papers. This necessarily  excludes  from consideration  those  variables  that were
used only in papers  that provide  a qualitative  rather than a formal  quantitative  assessment  of
indicators.  Therefore,  the discussion  that follows  focuses  on papers where:  (a) the indicators
were used to estimate  the probability  of a crisis; or (b) the indicators'  pre-crisis  behavior  was
systematically  compared  with its behavior  in a control  group (comprising  either  the same
countries  during "tranquil"  times or non-crises  countries);  or (c) the indicators'  ability for
signaling  future crises  was systematically  assessed  in quantitative  terms. Also,  the discussion
focuses  primarily  on papers  that examine  the experience  of various  countries,  as their
findings  are more likely  to be suitable  for generalization  than  the findings  of papers that
study  a single experience.
'6Foreign  exchange  market  "events"  include  significant  changes  in exchange
arrangements  (such as devaluations,  revaluations,  decisions  to float, and widening  of
exchange  rate bands);  "crises"  overlap  with events,  but include  unsuccessfill  speculative
attacks  and excludes  changes  in exchange  arrangements  not associated  with exchange  market
pressures.-12-
Table  3 identifies  the indicators  that worked  best by any of the above  criteria  in the subset  of
14 papers  that comply  with the criteria  mentioned  above.  For those  papers  that perform  the
pre-crisis/control-group  comparison,  the second  column  of the table lists those variables  for
which  the difference  in behavior  was significant  (at the 10 percent  level or higher)  in at least
one of the test performed  in the paper.  Notice,  however,  that abnormal  behavior  in the pre-
crisis  period is a necessary  but not a sufficient  condition  for an indicator  to be useful,  as some
of the variables  that pass  the univariate  tests are not significant  in multivariate  regressions.
For the papers  that estimate  the one-period  (or several  periods)  ahead probability  of a crisis,
the second  column  of Table  3 shows  the variables  that were statistically  significant  (at the
10  percent level or higher)  in the logit or probit regressions.  This winnows  the list of
indicators  considerable.  For instance,  Frankel  and Rose (1996)  initially  considered  16
possible  indicators,  but only 7 of them turned out to be statistically  significant.  The results
presented  in Otker  and Pazarbasioglu  (1994)  show  considerable  cross-country  variation
regarding  the variables  that survived  this test.
In the case  of the variables  used in Kaminsky  and Reinhart  (1996),  the second  column  in
Table 3 lists those whose  behavior  in the period leading  to a crisis  was significantly  different
from their  behavior  during "tranquil"  periods.  Within  this approach,  these are the variables
that would  be expected  to issue a relatively  large number  of good signals  (signals  that are
followed  by a crisis)  and few  false signals  (signals  that are not followed  by a crisis).  The
criterium  was to include  in Table 3 those variables  that had an (adjusted)  noise-to-signal
ratios lower  than unity.' 7 The (adjusted)  noise-to-signal  ratio for these variables  are presented
in Table 5, Section  IV, where  the "signals"  approach  is explained  in detail.
D.  Some General Results
Table  4 shows  the various indicators  (after  consolidating  the different  transformations  of the
same  variable)  included  in these studies.  For each indicator,  Table  4 shows  the number  of
studies  that tested the significance  of the indictor,  as well as the number  of studies  in which
the indicator  was found to be significant  in at least one of the tests conducted.
The comparison  of results  across  the various  papers  considered  above does  not provide  a
clear-cut  answer  concerning  the usefulness  of each of the potential  indicators  of currency
crisis.  This is not surprising  given  the number  of relevant  factors  that differ significantly
among  those  papers, such as the set of variables  simultaneously  included  in the tests, the way
of measuring  those variables,  the periodicity  of the data,  the estimation  technique,  etc.  Also,
as noted  above, some  variables  that are significant  in univariate  tests are not significant  in
multivariate  tests.
Despite  these difficulties,  a number  of conclusions  can be derived  from the tally shown  in
Table  4:
" 7The calculation  of this ratio is described  in detail  below. Essentially,  it is the ratio  of
false signals  (noise)  to good signals,  adjusted  to take into account  that in the sample  used in
the paper the number  of opportunities  for false and for good signals  differ.- 13  -
The first general conclusion is that an effective warning system should consider a broad
variety of indicators; currency crises seem to be usually preceded by multiple economic,
and sometimes political, problems. The evidence reviewed here points to the presence of both
domestic and external imbalances which span both the real side of the economy and the
domestic financial sector.
Second, those individual variables that receive ample support as useful indicators of
currency crises include international reserves, the real exchange rate, credit growth,
credit to the public sector, and domestic inflation. The results also provide support for the
trade balance, export performance, money growth, M2/international reserves, real GDP
growth, and the fiscal deficit.
Third, only tentative conclusions can be drawn regarding the other indicators, primarily
because they have been included in only one or two of the studies under review. Subject to
this caveat, the results suggest that several foreign, political, institutional, and financial
variables (other than those mentioned above), also have some predictive power in
anticipating currency crises.
Fourth, the variables associated with the external debt profile did not fare well. Also,
contrary to expectations, the current account balance did not receive much support as a
useful indicator of crises. This may be because the information provided by the behavior of
the current account balance to some extent already may have been reflected in the evolution
of the real exchange rate. In most of the studies in which the effect of the current account
balance was found to be non-significant, the real exchange also was included in the test, and
had a significant effect.
The issue of the empirical relevance of self-fulfilling crises is subject to debate. A number of
findings in Eichengreen, Rose and Wyplosz (1995) have been interpreted as evidence of  the
existence of self-fulfilling crises. Those findings include: (1) many crises did not seem to be
linked to the driving forces emphasized by models in the traditional approach; (2) some crises
that were not preceded, and were not followed, by a weakening of policies, so it is not
possible to argue that those crises were produced by economic agents correctly anticipating a
future deterioration in policies; and (3) those crises that occurred without obvious causes
were usually not anticipated by the market and not reflected in advance in interest rate
differentials.
Krugman (1996) has argued, however, that the findings described in (1), (2), and (3) above
do not constitute evidence in favor of self-fulfilling crises. The argument is as follows. Point
(1) is evidence against models in the traditional approach and in favor of recent models in
which the authorities devalue because of concern for variables other than international
reserves, but it is not evidence in favor of self-fulfilling crises. Point (2) provides evidence
against models with self-fulfilling crises because it is precisely in those models that policies
are assumed to respond to private sector actions, including the attack on the currency.
Finally, point (3) is not necessarily evidence in favor of self-fulfilling crises because, the
market should anticipate the possibility of crises, even those of the self-fulfilling type. It-14-
would  be more reasonable  to interpret  the evidence  in (3) as reflecting  some  myopia  on the
part of investors." 8
IV.  METHODOLOGICAL  ISSUES
This section  discusses  the relative  merits  of the alternative  approaches  used to assess  the
probability  of a currency  crisis,  and proceeds  to describe  in some  detail a methodology  that
serves  as the basis for the warning  system  proposed  in this paper.
A. Alternative  Approaches:  An Evaluation
The studies  reviewed  above have  used essentially  two alternative  methodologies  that could
serve  as the basis for an early  warning  system  of currency  crises.  The most commonly  used
approach  has been to estimate  the one-step  (or k-step)  ahead probability  of devaluation  in the
context of a multivariate  logit or probit model.  While  the explanatory  variables  have  been
quite varied,  the estimation  technique  has been quite uniform." 9 The second  approach  has
been  to compare  the behavior  of selected  variables  in the period preceding  crises  with their
behavior  in a control  group,  and to identify  those  variables  whose distinctive  behavior  could
be used  to help assess  the likelihood  of a crisis.  The particular  variant of this approach
presented  in Kaminsky  and Reinhart  (1996)  has progressed  to construct  a warning  system
based on signals  issued  by those  selected  variables.
The methodology  that estimates  the one-step  (or k-step) ahead  probability  of devaluation  has
the advantage  that it summarizes  the information  about  the likelihood  of a crisis in one useful
number,  the probability  of devaluation.  Also, as this approach  considers  all the variables
simultaneously,  and it disregards  those  variables  that do not contribute  information  that is
independent  from that provided  by other  variables  already  included  in the analysis.
This methodology,  however,  also  has some  important  limitations.  First, the methodology
does not provide  a metric  for ranking  the indicators  according  to their ability  to accurately
predict  crises  and avoid  false signals,  since  a variable  either  enters  the regression
significantly  or it does  not. While  measures  of statistical  significance  can help pinpoint  which
are the more reliable  indicators,  they provide  no information  on whether  the relative  strength
of that indicator  lies in accurately  calling  a high proportion  of crises  at the expense  of sending
numerous  false alarms,  or instead  missing  a large share  of crises  but seldom  sending  false
"Jeanne (1995)  takes a different  approach  to test for the existence  of self-fulfilling
crises  using data  on the French  Franc/deutsche  Mark exchange  rate for the period 1992-1993,
and concludes  that in fact  the estimated  relationship  has the shape  needed  to produce  multiple
equilibria  and self-fulfilling  crises.  These  findings,  however,  are not entirely  persuasive,
mainly  because  of the way in which the fundamentals  are treated  in the estimation.
'9Sachs,  Tornell,  and Velasco  (1996)  use an alternative  strategy,  but they  examine  the
different,  although  related,  issues of which  countries  were vulnerable  on the wake  of the
Mexican  crisis  and what accounted  for their vulnerability.- 15 -
alarms.  Furthermore,  the nonlinear  nature  of these models  make it difficult  to assess  the
marginal  contribution  of an indicator  to the probability  of a crisis. 20
Second,  this method  does not provide  a transparent  reading of where and how  widespread  the
macroeconomic  problems  are. Within  this approach,  it is difficult  to judge which  of the
variables  is "out-of-line,"  making  it less-than-ideally  suited for the purpose surveillance  and
pre-emptive  action.
In contrast,  the approach  in Kaminsky  and Reinhart  (1996)  tallies  the performance  of
individual  indicators,  and thus provides  information  on the source and  breadth  of the
problems  that underline  the probability  of a crisis.  Furthermore,  as explained  below, within
this approach  it is also possible  to estimate  the probability  of a crisis conditional  on the
signals  issued  by the various  indicators.  This conditional  probability  of crisis  will depend
directly  on the reliability  of the indicators  that are sending  the signals.  For instance,  if at any
point in time six indicators  are sending  signals,  the probability  of a crisis  conditional  on those
signals  will be higher if the signals  are coming  from the six best indicators  than if they are
coming  from a less reliable  group of indicators.
Based  on these considerations,  the "signals"  approach  seems  to be better suited  to serve  as
the basis for the design  of an early warning  system.  The methodology  employed,  while not
previously  applied  to analyze  currency  crises,  has a long history in the literature  that
evaluates  the ability  of macroeconomic  and financial  time series  to predict business  cycle
tuning  points. This methodology  is described  in detail below.
B. The "Signals"  Approach
This section  describes  the "signals"  approach  as well as some  of the empirical  results
obtained  by using this approach.  It summarizes  the discussion  in Kaminsky  and Reinhart
(1996),  who examine  76 currency  crises from a sample  of 15 developing  and 5 industrial
countries  during 1970-1995.  It also expands  the analysis  presented  in that paper by ranking
the indicators  by three alternative  metrics which  include:  calculating  the probability  of a
crisis  conditional  on a signal from that indicator;  the average  number  of months  prior to the
crisis  in which  the first signal  is issued;  and the persistence  of signals  ahead of crises.
Definitions
As mentioned  above, this approach  involves  monitoring  the evolution  of a number  of
economic  variables.  When one of these  variables  deviates  from its "normal"  level beyond  a
certain  "threshold"  value,  this is taken as a warning  signal  about a possible  currency  crisis
within  a specified  period of time. However,  in order  to make the approach  operational,  a
number  of terms must be defined.
Crisis:  A crisis  is defined  as a situation  in which an attack  on the currency  leads  to a sharp
depreciation  of the currency,  a large decline  in international  reserves,  or a combination  of the
two. A crisis so defined  includes  both successful  and unsuccessful  attacks on the currency.
20Note  that this marginal  contribution  is not independent  of the other  explanatory
variables  in the regression.-16-
The definition is also comprehensive enough to include not only currency attacks under a
fixed exchange rate but also attacks under other exchange rate regimes. For example, an
attack could force a large devaluation beyond the established rules of a prevailing crawling-
peg regime or exchange rate band.
For each country, crises are identified (ex-post) by the behavior of an index of "exchange
market pressure." This index is a weighted average of monthly percentage changes in the
exchange rate (defined as units of domestic currency per U.S. dollar or per deustche mark,
depending on which is the relevant) and (the negative of) monthly percentage changes in
gross international reserves (measured in U.S. dollars). 2' The weights are chosen so that the
two components of the index have the same conditional variance. As the index increases with
a depreciation of the currency and with a loss of international reserves, an increase in the
index reflects stronger selling pressure on the domestic currency.
In the empirical application, a crisis is identified by the behavior of the exchange market
pressure index. Periods in which the index is above its mean by more than three standard
deviations are defined as crises. 22 The appropriateness of this operational definition was
checked by examining developments in foreign exchange markets during the periods
identified as crises. In many cases, these periods included also other signs of turbulence such
as the introduction of exchange controls, the closing of the exchange markets, a change in the
exchange rate regime, etc.
Indicators: The choice of indicators was dictated by theoretical considerations and by the
availability of information on a monthly basis. They include: (1) international reserves (in
U.S. dollars); (2) imports (in U.S. dollars); (3) exports (in U.S. dollars); (4) the terms of trade
(defined as the unit value of exports over the unit value of imports); (5) deviations of the real
2 "Eichengreen, Rose, and Wyplosz (1995) also include the level of domestic interest
rates in their index of exchange market pressure, because the authorities could also resort to
increases in interest rates to defend the currency. However, this variable was not included in
the index used in Kaminsky and Reinhart (1996) because the data on market-determined
interest rates in developing countries do not span the entire sample period.
22For countries in the sample that, at different times, experienced very high inflation,
the criterium for identifying crises was modified. If a single level of the index had been used
to identify crises in these countries, sizable devaluations and reserve losses in the more
moderate inflation periods would not be identified as crises because the historic mean and
variance would be distorted by the high-inflation episodes. To avoid this problem, the sample
was divided according to whether inflation in the previous six months was higher than
150 percent, and a different level of the index (based on a different mean and variance) was
used to identify crises in each sub-sample. While this method is admittedly arbitrary, the
cataloging of crises obtained by this method follows closely the chronology of currency
market disruptions described in numerous articles.-17-
exchange  rate from trend  (in percentage  terms); 23 (6) the differential  between foreign  (U.S.  or
German)  and domestic  real interest  rates on deposits  (monthly  rates, deflated  using consumer
prices  and measured  in percentage  points);  (7) "excess"  real Ml balances; 24 (8) the money
multiplier  (of M2); (9) the ratio of domestic  credit  to GDP;  (10) the real interest  rate on
deposits  (monthly  rates,  deflated  using consumer  prices and measured  in percentage  points);
(11) the ratio  of (nominal)  lending  to deposit  interest  rates; 25 (12) the stock  of commercial
banks deposits  (in nominal  terms);  (13) the ratio of broad  money  (converted  into foreign
currency)  to gross  international  reserves;  (14) an index  of output; and (15)  an index  of equity
prices (measured  in U.S. dollars).
For all these  variables  (with  the exception  of the deviation  of the real exchange  rate from
trend,  the "excess"  of real MI balances,  and the three variables  based on interest  rates),  the
indicator  on a given  month  was defined  as the percentage  change  in the level of the variable
with respect  to its level a year  earlier.  Filtering  the data  by using the 12-month  percentage
change  ensures  that the units are comparable  across  countries  and that the transformed
variables  are stationary,  with well-defined  moments,  and free from seasonal  effects.
Signaling  horizon:  This is the period within  which the indicators  would  be expected  to have
an ability for anticipating  crises.  This period was defined  a-priori  as 24 months.  Thus, a
signal  that is followed  by a crisis  within 24 months  is called a good signal,  while a signal  not
followed  by a crisis  within  that interval  of time is called  a false signal,  or noise.
Signals  and thresholds:  An indicator  is said  to issue a signal  whenever  it departs  from its
mean beyond  a given threshold  level.  Threshold  levels are chosen so as to strike  a balance
between  the risks of having  many false signals  (which  would  happen  if a signal  is issued  at
the slightest  possibility  of a crisis) and the risk of missing  many  crises  (which  would happen
if the signal  is issued  only when the evidence  is overwhelming).
For each of the indicators,  the following  procedure  was used to obtain  the "optimal"  set of
country-specific  thresholds  that were employed  in the empirical  application.  Thresholds
were defined  in relation  to percentiles  of the distribution  of observations  of the indicator.  For
example,  a possible  set of country-specific  thresholds  for the rate of growth  of imports  would
be the set of rates of growth  (one  per country)  that would  leave 10 percent  of the observations
23The  real exchange  rate is defined  on a bilateral  basis with respect  to the German
mark for the European  countries  in the sample,  and with respect  to the U.S. dollar for all the
other  countries.  The real exchange  rate index  is defined  such that an increase  in the index
denotes  a real depreciation.
24Defined  as the percentage  difference  between  actual MI in real terms and an
estimated  demand  for Ml; the latter  is assumed  to be a function  of real GDP, domestic
inflation,  and a time trend.
25This  definition  of the spread  between  lending  and deposit  rates is preferable  to using
the difference  between  (nominal)  lending  and deposit  rates, because  this difference  is affected
by inflation  and thus the measure would  be distorted in the periods of high inflation.  An
alternative  would  have  been  to use the difference  between  real lending  and deposit  rates.- 18-
(on the rate of growth of imports) above the threshold for each country. Notice that while the
percentile used as reference (10 percent) is uniform across countries, the corresponding
country-specific thresholds (the rates of growth of imports associated with that 10 percent)
would most likely differ. This procedure was repeated using a grid of reference percentiles
between 10 percent and 20 percent, and the "optimal" set of thresholds was defined as the
one that minimized the noise-to-signal ratio; i.e., the ratio of false signals to good signals. 26
C. Empirical results
The effectiveness of the signals approach can be examined at the level of individual
indicators (the extent to which a given indicator is useful in anticipating crises) and at the
level of a set of indicators (the extent to which a given group of indicators taken together is
useful in anticipating crises). The discussion below examines the effectiveness of individual
indicators. It extends some of the analysis presented in Kaminsky and Reinhart (1996) by
ranking the various indicators according to their forecasting ability, and by examining the
lead time and persistence of their signals. An important area for future work would be to
combine the information on the various indicators to estimate the probability of a crisis
conditional on siniultaneous signals from any set of indicators.
In order to examnine  the effectiveness of individual indicators, it would be useful to consider
the performance of each indicator in terms of the following matrix:
Crisis (within 24 months)  No crisis (within 24 months)
Signal was issued  A  B
No signal was issued  C  D
In this matrix, A is the number of months in which the indicator issued a good signal, B is the
number of months in which the indicator issued a bad signal or "noise," C is the number of
months in which the indicator failed to issue a signal (which would have been a good signal),
and D is the number of months in which the indicator refrained from issuing a signal (which
would have been a bad signal). A perfect indicator would only produce observations that
belong to the north-west and south-east cells of this matrix. It would issue a signal in every
month that is to be followed by a crisis (within the next 24 months), so that A>0 and C=0,
and it would refrain from issuing a signal in every month that is not to be followed by a crisis
(iWlin  the next 24 months), so that B=0 and D>O.  Of course, in practice, none of the
indicators fit the profile of a perfect indicator. However, the matrix above will be a useful
reference to assess how close or how far is each indicator from that profile.
26For  variables such as international reserves, exports, the terms of trade, deviations of
the real exchange rate from trend, commercial bank deposits, output, and the stock market
index, for which a decline in the indicator increases the probability of a crisis, the threshold is
below the mean of the indicator. For the other variables, the threshold is above the mean of
the indicator.- 19-
Information on the performance of individual indicators is presented in Table 5. For each
indicator, the first column shows the number of crises for which data on the indicator are
available. The number of crises range from 33 to 72, with an average of 61 crises per
indicator. The second column shows the percentage of crises correctly called, defined as the
number of crises for which the indicator issued at least one signal in the previous 24
months (expressed as a percentage of the total number of crises for which data on the
indicator are available). Virtually every indicator called correctly at least half of the crises in
their respective samples. In average, the various indicators called correctly 70 percent of the
crises.
The third column of Table 5 shows an alternative measure of the tendency of individual
indicators to issue good signals. It shows the number of good signals issued by the indicator,
expressed as a percentage of the number of months in which good signals could have been
issued (A/(A+C) in terms of the above matrix). While obtaining 100 percent in the second
column of Table 5 would require that at least one signal be issued within the 24 months
prior to each crisis, a 100 percent in the third column would require that a signal be issued
every month during the 24 months prior to each crisis. In terms of the results in the third
column, the real exchange rate is the indicator that issued the highest percentage of possible
good signals (25 percent), while imports issued the lowest percentage of possible good
signals (9 percent).
The fourth column of Table 5 measures the performance of individual indicators regarding
sending bad signals. It shows the number of bad signals issued by the indicator, expressed
as a percentage of number of months in which bad signals could have been issued (B/(B+D)
in terms of the above matrix). Other things equal, the lower the number in this column the
better is the indicator. The real exchange rate, once again, shows the best performance
(issuing only 5 percent of possible bad signals), while the ratio of lending to deposit interest
rate shows the poorest performance (issuing 22 percent of possible bad signals).
The information about the indicators' ability to issue good signals and to avoid bad signals
can be combined into a measure of the "noisiness" of the indicators. The fifth column of
Table 5 shows the "adjusted" noise-to-signal ratio; this ratio is obtained by dividing false
signals measured as a proportion of months in which false signals could have been issued, by
good signals measured as a proportion of months in which good signals could have been
issued ([B/(B+D)]/[A/(A+C)] in terms of the above matrix). Other things constant, the lower
is the number in this columns the better is the indicator.
The various indicators differ significantly with respect to their adjusted noise-to-signal ratios.
While this ratio is only 0.19 for the real exchange rate, it is 1.69 for the ratio of lending to
deposit interest rates. The adjusted noise-to-signal ratio can be used as a criterium for
deciding which indicators to drop from the list of possible indicators. A signaling device that
issues signals at random times (and thus has no intrinsic predictive power) would obtain
(with a sufficiently large sample) an adjusted noise-to-signal ratio equal to unity. Therefore,
those indicators with an adjusted noise-to-signal ratio equal or higher than unity introduce
excessive noise, and thus are not helpful in predicting crises. Thus, on the basis of the results
presented in Table 5, there are four indicators that should be removed from the list of those to
be used within the signals approach. These indicators are: the ratio of lending interest rates to
deposit interest rates, bank deposits, imports, and the real interest rate differential.- 20 -
Another way of interpreting the above results regarding the noisiness of the indicators is by
comparing the probability of a crisis conditional on a signal from the indicator, AI(A+B) in
terms of the above matrix, with the unconditional probability of a
crisis-(A+C)/(A+B+C+D)  in terms of the above matrix. To the extent that the indicator has
useful information, the conditional probability would be higher than the unconditional one.
The sixth column of Table 5 presents the estimates of the conditional probabilities, while the
eight column shows the difference between the conditional and unconditional probabilities
for each of the indicators. From these estimates, it is clear that the set of indicators for which
the conditional probability of a crisis is lower than the unconditional probability, is the same
as the set for which the adjusted noise-to-signal ratio is higher than unity. In fact, it can be
proven that the two conditions are equivalent.
How leading are the leading indicators?
The previous discussion has ranked the indicators according to their ability to predict crises
while producing few false alarms. However, such criteria are silent as to the lead time of  the
signal. From the vantage point of a policymaker who wants to implement pre-emptive
measures he/she will not be indifferent between an indicator that sends signals well before
the crisis occurs and one that signals only when the crisis is imminent. In focussing on the
24-month window prior to the onset of the crisis, the criteria for ranking the indicators
presented in Table S does not distinguish between a signal given 12 months prior to the crisis,
and one given one month prior to the crisis.
To examine this issue, we tabulated for each of the indicators considered the average number
of months in advance of the crisis when the first signal occurs; this, of course, does not
preclude the fact that the indicator may continue to give signals through the entire period
immediately preceding the crisis. Table 6 presents the results. Indeed, the most striking
observation about these results is that, on average, all the indicators send the first signal
anywhere between a year and a year-and-a-half before the crisis erupts, with the real
exchange rate (our top-ranked indicator) offering the longest lead time. Hence, on this basis,
all the indicators considered are leading rather than coincident, which is consistent with the
spirit of an "early warning system."
Persistence of the signals
Another desirable feature in a potential leading indicator is that signals be more persistent
prior to crises (i.e. during the 24-month window) than at other times. To assess the behavior
of the indicators in this regard, the Table 7 presents a summary measure of the persistence of
the signals (measured as the average number of signals per period) during the pre-crisis
period relative to tranquil times. 27 As in the previous tables, the indicators are ranked
according to their performance. For instance, for the real exchange rate signals are more than
five times more persistent prior to crises than in tranquil times. For most of the top-tier
indicators, signals tend to be at least twice as persistent in pre-crisis periods relative to
tranquil times.
27Clearly,  this concept of persistence is just another way of looking at the noisiness of
the indicators; the measure in Table 7 is just the inverse of the adjusted noise-to-signal ratio.- 21 -
The main conclusion that follows from the discussion above is that the signals approach
can be useful as the basis for an early  warning  system  of currency  crises.  Within  this
approach, a number of indicators have shown to be helpful in anticipating crises.
Furthermore, the results from the signals approach are consistent with previous work on this
subject, as many of the indicators that proved to be useful within this approach (including the
real exchange rate, domestic credit, money, international reserves, exports, and output) also
received support from the review of the empirical literature presented in Section III. From the
vantage point of an early warning system, the results are encouraging in that the signaling, on
average, occurs sufficiently early to allow for pre-emptive policy actions.
V.  CONCLUDING  REMARKS
The studies reviewed in this paper indicate that an effective warning system for currency
crises should take into account a broad variety of indicators, as these crises are usually
preceded by symptoms that arise in a number of areas. Indicators that have proven to be
particularly useful in anticipating crises include the behavior of international reserves, the
real exchange rate, domestic credit, credit to the public sector, and domestic inflation. Other
indicators that have found support include the trade balance, export performance, money
growth, real GDP growth, and the fiscal deficit. The conclusions regarding the remaining
indicators examined in this paper are necessarily tentative, in part because of the limited
number of studies that formally tested their statistical significance in a variety of
circumstances.
This paper has proposed a specific early warning system for currency crises. This system
basically involves monitoring the behavior of a number of indicators, and recording the
"signals" issued by these indicators as they move beyond certain threshold levels. On any
given month, the system would estimate the probability of a crisis within the following 24
months conditional on the indicators issuing signals at that moment. Since the group of
indicators that are issuing signals would be identified, this would provide information about
the source and breath of the problems that underlie the probability of a crisis. The evidence
presented in this paper, based on the performance of individual indicators, has provided some
support for the signals approach.
Future work on the signals approach could combine the information on the various indicators
to estimate the probability of a crisis conditional on simultaneous signals from any subset of
indicators. Constructing and evaluating the performance of composite indices also appear as
a natural extension of this analysis.
Finally, it is important to recognize that while an early warning system would be an useful
tool for a timely assessment of the likelihood of a currency crisis, any such system is also
subject to limitations. There could be a number of issues, including of a political and
institutional nature, that may be relevant for a particular country at a particular moment in
time, and which are not incorporated in the warning system. A comprehensive assessment of
the situation would necessarily need to take those issues into account. Only then it would be
possible to have a coherent interpretation of events and a firm base for policy decisions.- 22 -
Table 1. Indicators of Crises: A Review of the Literature
Study  Sample and  Country  Indicators  Comments
Frequency  Coverage
Bilson  1955-1977,  32 countries with  (1) international reserves/base money  Use (2) to assess the size of the
(1979)  annual  emphasis on Ecuador,  (2) "shadow"  exchange rate  devaluation and (1) as an
Mexico, and Peru.  indicator of the probability  of a
Devaluations of at least  devaluation
5 percent.
Blanco and  1973-1981,  Mexico  (1) domestic credit growth  Focuses on the one-step ahead
Garber  (1986)  quarterly  probability  of devaluation, the
expected exchange rate
conditional on a devaluation, and
the unconditional expected
exchange rate.
Calvo  and  1983-1994,  Mexico  (1) M2  (in dollars)/reserve  Stress on growing stock
Mendoza  monthly and  (2) the money demand-supply gap  imbalances and maturity
(1995)  quarterly  mismatches in the financial sector
in explaining the crisis.
Collins (1995)  1979-1991,  18 countries with  (1) international reserves/GDP  (1)-(4) are used to determine the
annual  pegged exchange rates  (2) real GDP growth  distance from the critical
at the beginning of  (3) change in the real exchange rate  threshold at which a country
1979  (4) multiple exchange rate dummy  devalues and (5)-(7) are used to
(5) inflation  determine the mean rate at which
(6) current account/GDP  the economy is moving toward
(7) foreign aid  the critical level. The implied
probabilities of exchange rate
adjustment withing 6 to 60
months are calculated.
Cumby  and  1979-1980,  Argentina  (1) domestic credit growth  Focuses on the one-step ahead
Van  monthly  probability of collapse.
Wijenbergen
(1989)
Dornbusch,  1975-1995,  Argentina, Brazil,  (1) real exchange rate  While no formal tests are
Goldfajn,  and  annual  Chile, Finland, and  (2) real interest rates  performed, the discussion focuses
Valdes (1995)  quarterly  Mexico. Other  (3) GDP growth  on the common patterns in the
currency crashes are  (4) inflation  periods leading up to currency






Note: Additional details on the individual countries included in the larger cross-country studies are available in the original studies.- 23 -
Table  1. Indicators of Crises: A Review of  the Literature
Study  Sample and  Country  Indicators  Comments
Frequency  Coverage
Edin and  1978-1989,  Denmark, Finland,  (1) money  Estimate the one-step ahead
Vredin (1993)  monthly  Sweden and Norway.  (2) output  probability of devaluation, and
16 devaluations,  (3) foreign interest rate  the expected size of the
defined as shifts in the  (4) foreign price level  devaluation (measured as the
entire target zone.  (5) real exchange rate  change in the central parity of the
(6) international reserves/imports  target zone) conditional on a
(7) trade balance  devaluation taking place.
Edwards  1962-82,  39 devaluations;  (1) central bank foreign assets/base  The focus is on understanding the
(1989)  pooled  24 developing  money  causes of devaluations. (1)-(5)
quarterly data  countries with a fixed  (2) net foreign assets/MI  are used to estimate the
and annual  exchange rate for at  (3) domestic credit to public  probability of devaluation and
least 10 years serve as  sector/total credit  (6)-(12) are used to describe the
the control group. The  (4) bilateral real exchange rate  stylized facts of the 3 years
devaluations were at  (5) parallel market premium  preceding the devaluation.
least 15 percent with  (6) growth of credit
respect to the  (7) growth of credit to the public
U.S. dollar after having  sector
fixed the rate at least  (8) public sector credit growth/GDP
two years.  (9) fiscal deficit/GDP
(10) current account/GDP
(11) the terms of trade
(12) errors and omissions plus short-
term capital
(13) exchange controls
Edwards and  1962-1982,  20 devaluations of at  Same as (3)-(I 1) in Edwards (1989),  The stylized facts of 3, 1, and 0
Montiel (1989)  annual  least 15 percent with  and manufacturing  real wages.  years before the devaluation are
respect to the  described.
U.S. dollar after having
a fixed rate at least two
years.
Edwards and  1954-1971,  48 devaluations (26  Same as (2)-(10) in Edwards (1989).  The evolution of (2)-(10) and
Santaella  annual  under an IMF program)  (14) number of official exchange rates  (14) is compared for devaluers
(1993)  (15) political unpopularity  and nondevaluers.  Some of these
(16) democracy  variables and (15)-(20) are used
(17) political violence  to estimate the probability of
(18) Ideology (how leftist)  entering into an IMF program.
(19) number of coups
(20) relative GDP per capita
Note: Additional details on the individual countries included in the larger cross-country studies are available in the original studies.- 24  -
Table 1.  Indicators of Crises: A Review of the Literature
Study  Sample and  Country  Indicators  Comments
Frequency  Coverage
Eichengreen,  1959-1993,  20 industrial  countries;  The authors mention  that many of  The behavior  of (1)-(16) is
Rose and  quarterly  78 crises, 33 successful  (1)-(16) are defined with respect to  examined  during  the four years
Wyplosz  attacks  and  the same variable in Germany,  but do  around  crises  and events
(1995)  45 successful  defenses.  not specify which of them.  compared  to the evolution  of
(1) change in international  reserves  these  variables  around periods of
(2) real effective exchange  rate  tranquility.  " Events" include
(3) credit growth  significant  changes in exchange
(4) Ml growth  arrangements  (such as
(5) bond yield  devaluations,  decisions  to float,
(6) interest rates  and widening  of exchange rate
(7) stock prices  bands); " crises" overlap with
(8) inflation  events  but includes  unsuccessful
(9) wage growth  speculative  attacks  and excludes
(10) GDP growth  changes in exchange
(11) unemployment  rate  arrangements  not associated with
(12) employment  growth  market  pressures.  The association
(13) fiscal deficit/GDP  between (17)-(23)  and foreign
(14) current accountlGDP  exchange  market  events is also
(15) change in exports  examined.  A subset of (1)-(25) is
(16) change in imports  then used to estimate  the
(17) government  victory  probability  of: a successful
(18) government  loss  defense,  devaluation,  revaluation,
(19) elections  floating,  fixing, and other events.
(20) change in government
(21) capital controls
(22) left-wing  government
(23) new finance minister
(24) past exchange  market crisis
(25) past exchange  market event
Flood and  1957-1991,  17 Latin American  (1) drift of the real exchange rate  A model  is developed  and tested
Marion (1995)  monthly  countries; 80 peg  (2) variance of the real exchange  rate  that examines  the size and the
periods of a duration of  timing of devaluations-that  is
at least 3 months.  the duration of the peg; the focus
is on trade-off  between the cost
of realigning  and the costs of a
misalignment.
Note: Additional  details on the individual  countries  included in the larger cross-country  studies are available  in the original studies.- 25  -
Table 1.  Indicators of Crises: A Review of the Literature
Study  Sample and  Country  Indicators  Comments
Frequency  Coverage
Frankel and  1971-1992,  105 developing  (1) credit growth  (1)-(16)  are examined  to provide
Rose (1996)  annual  countries;  (2) fiscal deficit/GDP  a broad characterization  of
117 devaluations  of at  (3) per-capita  GDP growth  currency  crashes. The evolution
least 25 percent; for  (4) external debt/GDP  of these indicators  around crises
high-inflation  countries  (5) reserves/imports  is compared  to the behavior
these  musts exceed the  (6) current account/GDP  during tranquil  periods. The
previous year by at  (7) deviations from PPP in the  indicators  are used to predict the
least 10  percent.  bilateral real exchange  rate  probability of a crash.
(8) OECD GDP growth
(9) foreign interest rate
The following variables as a share of
total debt:
(10) commercial  bank loans
(11) concessional  loans
(12) variable rate debt
(13) short-term  debt
(14) public sector debt
(15) multilateral development  bank
loans
(16) flow of FDI
Goldstein  annual and  Argentina,  Brazil,  (1) international  interest rates  There are no formal  tests, but (1)-
(1996)  monthly  Chile, and Mexico.  (2) mismatch between the government  (7) are used to discuss  why some
Other crises  are also  and banking sectors short-term  assets  countries  were more  vulnerable
discussed.  and liabilities (such as M3/reserves)  than others in the wake of the
(3) current account/GDP  particularly  Mexican  crisis and the factors
one driven by a fall in saving  behind the crisis in Mexico.
(4) boom in bank lending followed  by
a decline in asset prices
(5) real exchange rate
(6) short-term  borrowing
(7) weak banking sector
Humberto,  monthly  Colombia  (1) credit growth  Calculate  the one-step  ahead
Julio, and  (2) parallel market premium  probability  of devaluation.
Herrera
(1991)
Kamin (1988)  1953-1983,  107  devaluations  of at  (1) trade balance/GDP  The evolution  of (I)-(9) is
annual  least 15 percent with  (2) import  growth  examined  3 years before  and
respect to the  (3) export  growth  4 years after the devaluations  and
U.S. dollar.  (4) capital flows/GDP  is compared  with the evolution  of
(5) changes in reserves  the same  variables in the control
(6) inflation  group.
(7) the real exchange  rate
(8) real GDP growth
(9) change in export  prices
Note: Additional  details on the individual  countries  included in the larger cross-country  studies are available in the original studies.
Table 1. Indicators  of Crises: A Review of the Literature
Study  Sample and  Country  Indicators  Comments
Frequency  Coverage- 26 -
Kaminsky and  1985-1987,  Argentina, Israel, and  (1) monetary shocks  Discuss  the probability  of crisis
Leiderman  monthly  Mexico  (2) fiscal shocks  in exchange-rate-based
(1995)  (3) past inflation  stabilization  programs.
Kaminsky  and  1970-1995,  20 countries;  (1) export growth  The behavior  of (I)-(I5) is
Reinhart  monthly  5 industrial and  (2) import growth  examined 18  months before and
(1996)  15 developing;  (3) bilateral real exchange  after the crises and compared to
76 currency  crises and  rate-deviation  from trend  the behavior  of these indicators
26 banking crises  (4) terms of trade changes  during "tranquir' periods. (16-17)
(5) changes in reserves  are used in predicting  the
(6) money demand/supply  gap  probability  of crises.  The
(7) changes in bank deposits  usefulness  of all the indicators  is
(8) real interest rates  assessed  by: (a) determining
(9) lending-deposit  spread  whether they gave a signal  on a
(10) domestic-foreign  real interest  crisis by crisis basis;  (b)
rate differential  tabulating  the probability  of crisis
(11) M2 money multiplier  conditioned  on a signal  from the
(12) M2/international  reserves  individual  indicator;  and (c)
(13) growth in domestic creditlGDP  tabulating  the probability  of false




Klein and  1957-1991,  87 peg episodes,  as in  (1) bilateral real exchange  rates  Using pooled data  (1)-(8)  are
Marion  monthly  Flood and Marion  (2) real exchange  rate squared  used to estimate  the probability
(1994)  (1995).  (3) net foreign assets of the monetary  of devaluation  at t +I; the sample
sector/Ml  is disaggregated  into  pre- and
(4) net foreign assets of the monetary  post-Bretton  Woods  period  and
sector/M  1 squared  distinctions  are made  between
(5) openness  pegs that are followed  by either a
(6) trade concentration  float or a crawling  peg from
(7) regular executive transfers  devaluations  followed  by a new
(8) irregular executive transfers  peg.
(9) months spent in the peg
Krugman  1988-1995,  France, Italy, Spain,  (I) unemployment  rate  While the bulk of the paper is
(1996)  annual,  Sweden, and the  (2) output  gap  theoretical,  evidence  on the
quarterly, some  United Kingdom  (3) inflation  trends of (l)-(4) is used to
daily  during the 1992-93  (4) public debt/GDP  support  the argument  that the
ERM crises.  ERM  episode does not provide
evidence  of self-fulfilling  crises.
Note: Additional  details on the individual  countries  included in the larger cross-country studies are available in the original studies.- 27 -
Table 1. Indicators  of Crises:  A Review of the Literature
Study  Sample and  Country  Indicators  Comments
Frequency  Coverage
Milesi-Ferretti  1970- 94,  Chile and Mexico have  (1) debt service/GDP  adjusted for  The emphasis  is on developing  a
and Razin  annual  the 4 crises cases;  GDP growth and changes in the real  notion of current account
(1995)  Ireland, Israel, and  exchange  rate  sustainability  and the factors it
South Korea are no  (2) exports/GDP  depends on. While there is no
crises cases due to  (3) real exchange  rate versus  formal test, (1)-(8)  are used to
policy reversal; and  historical norm  compare the crises and no crises
Australia  no crisis case  (4) saving/GDP  episodes.
with no policy change.  (5) fiscal stance
(6) fragility of the banking sector
(7) political instability
(8) composition of capital flows
Moreno  (1995)  1980-94,  Indonesia,  Japan,  (1) change in bilateral exchange  rate  The emphasis is on testing
monthly and  Malaysia,  Philippines,  (2) changes in net foreign assets  whether  the behavior  of
quarterly  Singapore,  Korea, and  (central  bank)  macroeconomic  variables  (4)-
Thailand. 126 episodes  (3) domestic-foreign  interest rate  (10) differs between "tranquil"
of speculative  differential  and "speculative"  periods. (I)-(3)
pressures; 72 in the  (4) exports/imports  are used to define such periods.
direction of  (5) output gap
depreciation and 54 in  All the following  are relative to the
the direction  of  United States:
appreciation.  (6) growth of domestic  credit/reserve
money
(7) growth in Ml
(8) growth in broad money
(9) fiscal deficit/government  spending
(10) inflation
Otker and  1979-93,  Denmark, Ireland,  (1) domestic credit  The aim is to use (1)-(I0) to
Pazarbasioglu  monthly  Norway, Spain, and  (2) real effective exchange rate  estimate  the probability  of
(1994)  Sweden.  The sample  (3) trade balance  abandoning  the peg by either
covers 15 devaluations  (4) unemployment  rate  devaluing  or floating.  (1)-(8)  are
and 10  realignments  of  (5) German price level  associated  for macroeconomic
all central rats.  (6) output  "fundamentals"  while (7), (9),
(7) reserves  and (10) are proxies for
(8) central parity  "speculative factors."
(9) foreign-domestic  interest rate
differential
(10) position within band
Note: Additional  details on the individual  countries  included in the larger cross-country  studies are available in the original studies.-28 -
Table 1. Indicators  of Crises: A Review  of  the Literature (concluded)
Study  Sample and  Country  Indicators  Comments
Frequency  Coverage
Otker and  1982-1994,  Mexico. During the  (1) real exchange  rate  (1)-(10) are used to estimate  the
Pazarbasioglu  monthly  sample  there are  (2) international  reserves  one-step ahead probability  of a
(1995)  4 devaluations;  (3) inflation differential with the  regime change. The relative
3 increases  in the rate  United States  importance  of the indicators is
of crawl, and 2  (4) output growth  assessed  for pre- and post-
reductions;  and 2 shifts  (5) U.S. interest rates  November 1991,  when the dual
to a more flexible  (6) central bank credit to the banking  exchange  rate system was
exchange  system.  system  abandoned.
(7) financial sector reform dummy
(8) share of short-term foreign
currency debt
(9) fiscal  deficit
(10) current account balance
Sachs, Tornell,  1985-1995,  20 emerging  market  (1) the real exchange rate  The emphasis is on explaining
and Velasco  monthly and  countries  (2) credit  to the private sector/GDP  why some countries  were more
(1995)  annual  (3) M2/international  reserves  affected by the Mexican crisis
(4) saving/GDP  than others.
(5) investment/GDP
(6) capital inflows/GDP
(7) short-term  capital inflows/GDP
(8) government  consumption/GDP
(9) current account/GDP
Note: Additional details on the individual  countries included in the larger cross-country studies  are available  in the original studies.-29  -
Table  2. Indicators  by Category
Sector  Indicators
External
Capital  account  (1) international  reserves/base  money  (10) errors  and omissions  plus short-term
(2) international  reserves/GDP  capital
(3) stock of international  reserves  (I  1) share capital  flows in  the form  of
(4) reserves/imports  short-term  borrowing
(5) growth  in reserves  (12) short-term  capital flows/GDP
(6) central  bank foreign  assets/base  (13) FDVIdebt
money  (14) capital  account  balance/GDP
(7) growth  of central  bank net foreign  (15) domestic-foreign  real interest  rate
assets  differential
(8) net foreign  assets/Ml  (16) domestic-foreign  nominal  interest
(9) net foreign  assets/Mi  squared  rate differential
Debt  profile  (1) foreign  aid  (7) share of short-term  debt
(2) external  debt/GDP  (8) share of public  sector debt
(3) public  debt/GDP  (9) share of multilateral  development
(4) share  of commercial  bank loans  bank loans
(5) share  of concessional  loans  (10) debt service/GDP  adjusted  for GDP
(6) share  of variable-rate  debt  growth
Current  account  (1) change  in real exchange  rate  (9) trade balance/GDP
(2) level of the real exchange  rate  (10) current  account/GDP
(3) drift of the real exchange  rate  (11) exports/GDP
(4) variance  of the real exchange  rate  (12) exports/imports
(5) deviations  from PPP in the real  (13) change  in exports
bilateral  exchange  rate  (14) change  in imports
(6) deviations  from trend  in the real  (15) saving/GDP
exchange  rate  (16) investmentlGDP
(7) deviations  from historical  average  of  (17) change  in the terms-of-trade
the real  exchange  rate  (18) change  in export  prices
(8) real exchange  rate squared
International  (1) OECD  real  GDP growth  (3) U.S. interest  rates
(2) international  interest  rates  (4) foreign  price level- 30 -
Table  2. Indicators  by Category  (concluded)
Sector  Indicators
Financial
Financial  liberalization  (1) real interest  rates  (5) growth  in M2 multiplier
(2) credit  growth  (6) growth  of credit/reserve  money
(3)  growth in credit/GDP  relative  to the United  States
(4) lending-deposit  interest  rate spread
Other  fmancial  (1)  "shadow"  exchange  rate  (9) MI growth  relative  to the
(2) parallel  market  premium  United States
(3) central  parity  (10) broad  money  growth  relative  to the
(4) position  within  the band  United States
(5) central  bank credit  to the banking  (11) change  in bank deposits
system  (12) bond-yields
(6) money  demand-supply  gap  (13) inflation
(7) Ml growth  (14) inflation  relative  to the US
(8) Ml level  (15) M2/international  reserves
Real sector  (1) real  GDP growth  (6) wage growth
(2) per-capita  growth  (7) unemployment  rate
(3) output  level  (8) employment  growth
(4) output  gap  (9) changes  in stock  prices
(5) manufacturing  real  wages
Fiscal  (1) fiscal  deficit/GDP  (4) domestic  credit  to public  sector/total
(2) fiscal  deficit/government  spending  credit
relative  to the United  States  (5) growth  in public  sector  credit
(3) government  consumption/GDP  (6) public  sector  credit  growth/GDP
Institutional/structural  (1) multiple  exchange  rate dummy  (6) openness
(2) exchange  controls  dummy  (7) trade concentration
(3) relative  GDP  per capita  (8) months  spent on peg
(4) financial  liberalization  dummy  (9) past foreign  exchange  market  crisis
(5) banking  crisis dummy  (10) past foreign  exchange  market  event
Political  (1) govemment  victory  dummy  (6) illegal  executive  transfers
(2) government  loss dummy  (7) degree of political  instability
(3) elections  (8) left-wing  government
(4) change  in government  (9) new finance  minister
(5) legal executive  transfers-31  -
Table 3. Indicators  of Crises:  What  Worked  Best?
Study  "Preferred"  Indicators  Comments  Other  Issues
Bilson  (1979)  (1) international  reserves/base  The probability  of a  The shadow  exchange  rate
money  devaluation  one year  appears  to have some
increases  from about  predictive  power,  but no
5 percent for countries  in  formal  tests are conducted.
which  (1) is 30 percent  or
greater,  to 40 percent  for
countries  where  (1) is less
than 10  percent.
Collins  (1995)  (1) international  (1) is the key determinant  of  The remaining  4 variables
reserves/GDP  the distance  from threshold;  were statistically
(2) real GDP  growth  (2) is marginally  significant;  insignificant.  The  model
(3) inflation  (3) is the key determinant  of  worked  best in predicting
the mean  rate at which  the  exchange  rate adjustments
economy  is moving  toward  within 12 months;  countries
the critical  level.  which  actually  adjusted
showed  an estimated
probability  of 46 percent
versus  a 28 percent
probability  for those  that did
not adjust.
Edin and Vredin (1993)  (1) money  (I)-(3) have a significant  The remaining  variables  were
(2) output  effect  on the probability  of  statistically  insignificant.  The
(3) international  devaluation.  (1),  (2), and the  estimates  of the probability  of
reserves/imports  real  exchange  rate  have a  devaluation  seems  robust,  but
significant  effect  on the size  those of the size of
of the devaluation.  devaluations  are much less
robust.
Edwards (1989)  (1) central  bank foreign  (l)-(5) have the predicted  The remaining  variables  were
assets/base  money  effects  on the probability  of a  not significantly  different
(2) net foreign  assets/Ml  devaluation and (6)-(l0) are  across  the two groups  of
(3) domestic  credit to public  significantly  different  for the  countries.  Since  the data is
sector/total  credit  devaluers  than for the control  annual  and the variables  are
(4) bilateral  real exchange  group.  lagged  one period,  these  are
rate  one-year  ahead  predictions.
(5) parallel  market  premium
(6) growth  of credit
(7) growth  of credit to the
public  sector
(8) public  sector  credit
growth/GDP
(9) fiscal  deficit/GDP
(10) current  accounttGDP- 32 -
Table 3. Indicators  of Crises:  What  Worked  Best?
Study  "Preferred"  Indicators  Commnents  Other  Issues
Eichengreen,  Rose,  and  (1) inflation  (1)-(6)  were statistically  The variables  that were not
Wyplosz (1995)  (2) employment  growth  significant  in the multivariate  significant  in the estimation
(3) current  account/GDP  analysis  that  estimates  the  of the probability  of an attack
(4) capital  controls  probability  of a (successful  or  includes:  credit  growth,  GDP
(5) government  loss  unsuccessful)  attack.  growth,  unemployment  rate,
(6) past foreign  exchange  fiscal  deficitlGDP,
market  crisis  government  victory,  and past
foreign  exchange  market
event.
Flood  and Marion (1995)  (1) drift of the real exchange  The  size of the devaluation  The overall  fit of the
rate  and  the duration  of the peg  equations  (I)-(2) do better
(2) variance  of the real  are significantly  determined  predicting  the size of the
exchange  rate  by (I)-(2) with  the signs  devaluation  than  the time
predicted  by theory.  spent  in peg, where  the share
of the explained  variation  is
35 percent  or less, depending
on the specification.
Frankel and Rose (1996)  (1) concessional  debt/total  (I)-(7)  help predict  crises  one  The  remaining  indicators
debt  year in advance.  All the  were not significant  in the
(2) public  sector  debt/total  variables  have  the expected  multivariate  probit estimation
debt  signs.  Increases  in (2), (4),  of the one-step  ahead
(3) foreign  direct  (6),  and (7) increase  the  probability  of a crash.  Only 5
investment/total  debt  probability  of a crash;  of 69 crises  were predicted  by
(4) overvaluation  of the real  increases  in (1),  (3), and (5)  the model.
exchange  rate  have the opposite  effect.
(5) reserves/imports
(6) foreign  interest  rate
(7) credit growth
Kamin (1988)  (1) trade balance/GDP  The evolution  of ()-(6)  is  The paper also  examines  the
(2) export  growth  significantly  different  for the  evolution  of the indicators  in
(3) import growth  devaluers  than for the control  the post-devaluation  period.
(4) real exchange  rate  group  during  3 to I year
(5) real GDP  growth  before devaluation.
(6) inflation-33 -
Table  3. Indicators  of Crises:  What  Worked  Best?
Study  "Preferred"  Indicators  Comments  Other  Issues
Kaminsky  and Reinhart  (1) export  growth  In 3/4 of the crises  at least  The indicators  are compared
(1996)  (2) bilateral  real exchange  60 percent  ofthe indicators  on the basis  of the percent  of
rate--deviation  from trend  were giving a signal.  External  crises  accurately  called  and
(3) terms of trade  changes  sector  variables  and  those  on the noise-to-signal  ratio.
(4) changes  in reserves  linked  to financial  (1),  (6), and (8) have the
(5)  money  demand/supply  liberalization  provided  the  highest  share of accurately-
gap  most accurate  signals  during  called  crises  while (2) has  the  I
(6) real interest  rates  the 12 months  before  the  lowest  noise-to-signal  ratio.
(7) M2 money  multiplier  crises.  Banking  crisis  help
(8) M2/international  reserves  predict  the probability  of a
(9) growth  in domestic  balance-of-payments.
credit/GDP
(10) changes  in stock prices
(11) output  growth
(12) banking  crises
Klein and Marion (1994)  (1) bilateral  real exchange  (l)-(8) affect  the probability
rates  that the peg will be
(2) real exchange  rate squared  abandoned;  the significance
(3) net foreign  assets  of the  of (2),  (4), and (7) is
monetary  sector/MI  particularly  sensitive  to the
(4) net foreign  assets  of the  specification  used.
monetary  sector/MI  squared
(5) openness
(6) irregular
(7) regular  executive  transfers
(8) months  spent in the peg
Moreno (1995)  (1) growth  in broad money  The differences  were  The analysis  is
relative  to the United  States  significant  for periods  where  contemporaneous,  or using
(2) fiscal  deficit  speculative  pressures  were in  only  one month  before  the
(3) output  the direction  of depreciation.  speculative  attack;  hence,  the
(4) inflation  If Japan  is excluded  from  the  analysis  does not say much
sample  (2) is not significantly  about whether  the indicators
different  from tranquil  behave  differently  in the
periods.  periods leading  up to the
crisis.
Otker and Pazarbasioglu  (1) domestic  credit  The importance  of the  The estimated  probability  of
(1994)  (2) real effective  exchange  variables  varied  across  devaluation  increase
rate  countries  in individual  markedly  ahead  of
(3) trade balance  country  regressions.  In a  devaluations.
(4) foreign-domestic  interest  regression  including  all
rate differential  countries  (except  Denmark,
(5) unemployment  rate  because  it had no
(6) German  price level  devaluation),  the significant
(7) output  variables  were (2), (4),  (5),
(8) international  reserves  (6),  and (10).
(9) central  parity
(10) position  within  the band-34-
Table 3. Indicators of Crises: What Worked Best? (concluded)
Study  "Preferred" Indicators  Comments  Other Issues
Otker  and Pazarbasioglu  (1) real exchange rate  (1)-(5) explain the probability  The role of (4) becomes more
(1995)  (2) international reserves  of a devaluation; the  important while the role of (5)
(3) inflation differential with  remaining variables were not  becomes less so in
the United States  statistically significant. The  forecasting the December
(4) central bank credit to the  interaction of (1}-(5) with (6)  1994 crisis. The predictive
banking system  was significant suggesting a  capacity of the model
(5) fiscal deficit  structural change.  forecasting crisis 6 months
(6) financial sector reform  ahead deteriorates
interaction dummy  considerably.
Sachs, Tornell  ,and Velasco  (1) change in real exchange  (1)-(2) are used to define  The remaining indicators
(1995)  rate  whether the "fundamentals"  were statistically
(2) change in credit to the  are weak or strong, and (3) is  insignificant. The exercise
private sector/GDP  used to define whether  was intended to assess the
(3) M2/international reserves  reserves are low or high. The  factors that made countries
(4) short-term capital  simultaneous combination of  vulnerable following the
inflows/GDP  weak fundamentals and low  Mexican crisis. However, it
(5) government  reserves made countries  does not assess the indicator
consumption/GDP  vulnerable to contagion  properties of the variables in
effects following the Mexican  predicting individual crises
crisis. (4) and (5) also had an  within the 1986-95 sample




Table  4. Performance  of Indicators
Number of Studies  Statistically Significant
Sector  Variables  Considered  Results
Capital  account  international  reserves  11  10
short-term  capital  flows  2  1
foreign  direct  investment  I  I
capital account balance  I  --
domestic-foreign  interest  differential  2  1
Debt profile  foreign aid  I
external debt  I
public  debt  I  1
share  of commercial  bank loans  I  --
share of concessional  loans  I
share of variable-rate debt  I  --
share of short-term debt  2  --
share  of multilateral  development
bank debt  I  --
Current  account  real exchange  rate  12  10
current  account  balance  6  2
trade balance  3  2
exports  3  2
imports  1/  2  1
terms of trade  2  1
export prices  I  --
savings  I  --
investment  I  --
International  foreign  real  GDP growth  I  --
foreign  interest  rates  3  1
foreign  price level  2  1
Financial  liberalization  real interest  rates  1  1
credit  growth  7  5
lending-deficit  interest  spread  I  --
money  multiplier  1  I
Other  financial  parallel  market  premium  1  I
central  parity  1  I
position  within  the band  I  1
money  demand-supply  gap  I  1
change in bank deposits  I  --
central  bank credit  to banks  I
money  3  2
M2/international  reserves  2  2
Real sector  inflation  2/  5  5
real GDP  growthvor  level  8  5
output  gap  I  I
employmentlunemployment  3/  3  2
change  in stock  prices  I  I-36  -
Table  4. Performance  of Indicators  (concluded)
Number  of Studies  Statistically  Significant
Sector  Variables  Considered  Results
Fiscal  fiscal  deficit  5  3
government  consumption  I  I
credit  to public  sector  3  3
Institutional  multiple  exchange  rates  I  --
/structural  exchange/capital  controls  4/  2  1
openness  1  1
trade concentration  1  --
banking crisis  1  1
financial  liberalization  2  1
months  spent on peg  1  1
past foreign  exchange
market  crisis 5/  1  1
past foreign  exchange
market event 6/  1  --
Political  government victory  1  --
government  loss  1  1
legal executive  transfer  1  1
illegal  executive  transfer  1  1
1/  In the statistically  significant  results,  the rate of growth  of imports  declines  prior to a devaluation.
2/ In one of the statistically  significant  results,  an increase  in inflation  reduces  the probability  of an attack.
3/ In one of the statistically  significant  results,  an increase  in employment  increases  the probability  of an unsuccessful  attack.
4/ In the statistical  significant  result,  the presence  of capital  controls  increases  the probability  of an unsuccessful  attack  and reduces
the probability  of a successful  attack.
5/ A past  foreign  exchange  market  crisis  reduces  significantly  the possibility  of an unsuccessful  attack,  and increases  marginally  the
possibility  of a successful  one.
6/ Events  include  significant  changes  in exchange  arrangements  (such  as devaluations,  revaluations,  decisions  to float,  and widening
of exchange  rate  bands); crises  overlap  with events  but include  unsuccessful  speculative  attacks  and excludes  changes  in exchange
arrangements  not associated  with  market  pressure.-37  -
Table 5. "Signals" Approach. Performance of Indicators
Number of  Percentage  of  Good Signals  Bad Signals as  Noise/Signal  P(Crisis/Signal)3/  P(Crisis/Signal)
Crises for which  Crisis Called  as Percentage  Percentage of  (adjusted) 2/  - P(Crisis)4/
there are Data  1/  of Possible  Possible Bad
Good Signals  Signals
(1)  (2)  (3)  (4)  (5)  (6)  (7)
In terms of the matrix in  A/(A+C)  B/(B+D)  [B/(B+D)]/  A/(A+B)
the text  [A/(A+C)]
Real exchange rate  72  57  25  5  0.19  67  39
Exports  72  85  17  7  0.42  49  20
Stock prices  53  64  17  8  0.47  49  18
M2/international  reserves  70  80  21  10  0.48  46  17
Output  57  77  16  8  0.52  49  16
"Excess" MI balances  66  61  16  8  0.52  43  15
International  reserves  72  75  22  12  0.55  41  13
M2 Multiplier  70  73  20  12  0.61  40  11
Domestic  credit/GDP  62  56  14  9  0.62  39  11
Realinterestrate  44  89  15  11  0.77  34  6
Terms  of trade  58  79  19  15  0.77  36  6
Real interest differential  42  86  11  11  0.99  29  0
Imports  71  54  9  11  1.16  26  -3
Bank deposits  69  49  16  19  1.20  25  -4
Lending rate/deposit rate  33  67  13  22  1.69  18  -9
1/ Percentage  of crises in which the indicator issued at least one signal in the previous 24 months, out of the total number of  crises for which data are available.
2/ Ratio of false signals (measured  as a proportion of months in which false signals could have been issued) to good signals (measured as a proportion of months in which
good signals could have been issued).
3/ Percentage  of the signals issued by the indicator  that were followed  by at least one crisis within the subsequent 24 months.
4/ P (Crisis) is the unconditional  probability of a crisis, (A+C)/(A+B+C+D)  in terms of the matrix in the text. This probability ranges from 27 percent to 33 percent
depending on the indicator. The unconditional probability  varies across indicators  because not all of them have observatories for the same 3ernod.Table 6. Average  Lead  Time
Indicator  Number  of Months  in Advance  of
the Crisis  When  First Signal  Occurs
Real exchange  rate  17
Real interest  rate  17
Imports  1  6
M2 multiplier  16
Output  16
Bank deposits  15
"Excess"  Ml balances  15
Exports  15
Terns of Trade  15
International  reserves  15
Stock  prices  14
Real interest  differential  14
M2/international  reserves  13
Lending  rate/deposit  rate  13
Domestic  credit/GDP  12Table  7. Persistence  of Signals
Indicator  Persistence  During  Crises  Relative
to Tranquil  Tines
Real exchange  rate  5.14
Exports  2.37
Stock  prices  2.15
M2/international  reserves  2.07
Output  1.93
"Excess"  MI balances  1.92
International  reserves  1.82
M2 Multiplier  1.64
Domestic  credit/GDP  1.62
Real interest  rate  1.30
Terms  of trade  1.29
Real interest  differential  1.01
Imports  0.86
Bank deposits  0.84
Lending  rate/deposit  rate  0.59References
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